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IN LIGHT OF REASON AND EXPERIENCE:
AGAINST A CRIME FRAUD EXCEPTION TO THE
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
Catherine Thompson Dobrowitsky*
This Note argues against the adoption of a crime fraud exception to the federal
psychotherapist-patient privilege. Part I argues that the restrictive legal elements
of the privilege adequately exclude fraudulent or criminal statements from protec-
tion. Part II addresses the needed distinction between the dangerous patient
exception and the crime fraud exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege
and concludes that the adoption of a crime fraud exception would threaten a lim-
ited dangerous patient exception. Part III contends that the policies underlying
the attorney-client and psychotherapist-patient privileges must be distinguished
and do not merit a shared crime fraud exception. This Note concludes that care-
ful examination and application of the elements of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege will adequately protect "all rational means for ascertaining truth" in the
courtroom, in consideration of the need for confidentiality in a psychotherapist-
patient relationship.
In an adversarial judicial system, the examination of evidence by
a fact finder is central to the determination of liability.' In some
cases, however, the need to safeguard confidentiality in a
professional relationship may outweigh the maxim that the jury
has a right to hear "every man's evidence."2 Before recognizing an
evidentiary privilege, the need for protected disclosure between
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of Michigan, 2001-2002. I would like to thank Jessica Sims and Caroline Brown for their
valuable comments and advice. In addition, I would like to express my gratitude to my hus-
band, Josh, and to my parents, John and Susan Thompson, for their patience, insight, love
and support.
1. The Federal Rules of Evidence are constructed tojustly ascertain truth through ef-
ficient administration. See FED. R. EVID. 102.
2. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996) (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S.
323, 331 (1950)) (citations omitted) (holding that federal law recognizes a psychotherapist-
patient privilege; therefore, statements that defendant police officer made regarding her
involvement in a shooting to a licensed social worker in course of psychotherapy were pro-
tected from compelled disclosure); see FED. R. EVID. 501:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivi-
sion thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
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practitioner and client is weighed against the harm of withholding
potentially important facts from the jury orjudge at trial.'
Federal courts recognize confidential communications between
a psychotherapist and patient, which occur in the course of diag-
nosis or treatment, as privileged.4 The individuals able to invoke
the privilege are the patient, a person authorized by the patient, or
the psychotherapist.5 The patient may waive the privilege, either
explicitly or impliedly, or by placing his mental condition at issue.6
The privilege presumptively survives the death of the patient.
7
The psychotherapist-patient privilege "serves the public interest
by facilitating the provision of appropriate treatment for individu-
als suffering the effects of a mental or emotional problem. The
mental health of our citizenry, no less than its physical health, is a
public good of transcendent importance. 8 Rooted in the need for
confidence and trust between practitioner and client, effective psy-
chotherapy depends upon an atmosphere in which the patient is
3. SeeJaffee, 518 U.S. at 9 ("Exceptions from the general rule disfavoring testimonial
privileges may be justified, however, by a 'public good transcending the normally predomi-
nant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.'") (citations omitted);
In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Violette), 183 F.3d 71, 74 (Ist Cir. 1999) (noting the proper
inquiry is "whether protecting a particular class of confidential communications 'promotes
sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence'") (citations
omitted); see also Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 201-02 (1990) (declining to recognize
a peer academic review privilege); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44-46 (1980)
(recognizing a spousal privilege and explaining the history behind the privilege between
priest and penitent, attorney and client, and physician and patient); Couch v. United States,
409 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1973) (declining to recognize an accountant-client privilege); Clark v.
United States, 289 U.S. 1, 1 (1933) (declining to recognize privilege protecting juror delib-
erations when the relation is fraudulent); In re Sealed Case (Rubin), 148 E3d 1073, 1079
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (declining to recognize a Secret Service agent privilege), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 990 (1998). See generally Nixon v. United States, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (noting that
testimonial privileges are recognized at the cost of "derogation of the search for truth").
4. SeeJaffee, 518 U.S. at 11. Federal common law, all fifty states and the District of Co-
lumbia recognize the psychotherapist-patient privilege. See id. at 12. Although beyond the
scope of this Note, state law governs the appropriate evidentiary privilege in federal diver-
sity cases. See FED. R. EVID. 501. Similar to attorneys, psychotherapists have an ethical duty to
maintain the confidences of their clients. SeeJaffee, 518 U.S. at 13 n.12 (listing ethical codes
of psychotherapists).
5. See United States . Hansen, 955 E Supp. 1225, 1226 (D. Mt. 1997). The party as-
serting the privilege has the burden of showing that the privilege applies. See In re Grand
Jury Proceedings (Violette), 183 F.3d at 73.
6. See Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co., 170 F.R.D. 127, 130 (E.D. Pa. 1997). Courts
have split as to whether suing for damages for emotional distress waives the psychotherapist-
patient privilege. See Vasconcellos v. Cybex Int'l, Inc., 962 E Supp. 701, 708-09 (D. Md.
1997) (privilege waived). But see Fritsch v. City of Chula Vista, 187 ER.D. 614, 631 (S.D. Cal.
1999) (privilege not waived); Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark, 174 F.R.D. 225, 230 (D. Mass.
1997) (privilege not waived).
7. See Hansen, 955 E Supp. at 1226. Similar to the attorney-client privilege, confes-
sions to a psychotherapist of past crimes are privileged and inadmissible. See In re Grand
Jury Proceedings (Violette), 183 E3d at 76-77.
8. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11.
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions,
memories, and fears. 9 Absent the protection a privilege provides,
"confidential conversations between psychotherapists and their
patients would surely be chilled."10
Although adopted by federal courts, the psychotherapist-patient
privilege is not absolute and its limits have yet to be fully deter-
mined. Two possible exceptions have already been identified.
First, the Supreme Court noted that the privilege might not apply
"if a serious threat of harm to the patient or to others can be
averted only by means of a disclosure by the therapist." 2 Under
this reasoning, the privilege may not apply if "the preservation and
protection of the health and safety of innocent third parties out-
weighs the good achieved by maintaining the confidentiality of life-
threatening communications."1 California was the first state to
recognize this dangerous patient exception to the psychotherapist-
patient privilege. Its Supreme Court noted that once "a patient
poses a serious danger of violence to others, [the psychotherapist]
bears a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the foreseeable
victim of that danger."
4
California is the only state in which breach of the professional
duty of confidentiality between patient and psychotherapist
constitutes a waiver of the evidentiary privilege."5 "[O]nce
confidential 'statements have been revealed to third persons in a
communication that is not itself privileged ... they are no longer
confidential.' , 6 Under this rationale, should the psychotherapist
warn a potential victim of the danger posed by a patient, the
disclosure of the threat to that third party waives the privilege. 7
The psychotherapist is then able to testify in court proceedings
9. See id. at 10.
10. Id. at 11-12.
11. See id. at 18 ("[1]t is neither necessary nor feasible to delineate its full contours in a
way that would 'govern all conceivable future questions in this area.' ") (quoting Upjohn v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386 (1981)).
12. Id. at 18 n.19.
13. United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578, 583 (6th Cir. 2000).
14. Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 345 (Cal. 1976).
15. See, e.g., Hayes, 227 F.3d at 585. See CAL EviD. CODE § 1024 (West 1995) (codifica-
tion of this rule). See also People v. Wharton, 809 P.2d 290, 306 (Cal. 1991) (en banc).
Federal circuits have split as to whether breach of the professional duty of confidentiality
waives the evidentiary privilege. Compare Hayes, 227 F.3d at 586 (rejecting federal dangerous
patient exception as waiver of privilege), with United States v. Glass, 133 E3d 1356, 1356-57
(10th Cir. 1998) (recognizing limited federal dangerous patient exception as waiver of the
privilege).
16. Wharton, 809 P.2d at 307 (citations omitted).
17. See id. at 307-08.
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concerning "only those communications that triggered or caused
the warning." "'
Second, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized a
crime fraud exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege akin
to that which exists under the attorney-client privilege. 9 To invoke
the crime fraud exception, it must be shown that the client was en-
gaged or acting in furtherance of criminal or fraudulent activity at
the time the communications were made.20 The crime fraud excep-
tion then permits a psychotherapist to testify in court concerning
statements made in therapy if the client's purpose was to plan or
commit a crime.2' Since communications that are intended to fur-
ther a crime or fraud will rarely be allied with genuine
psychotherapy, protecting such statements would frustrate the
22purpose of the privilege.
This Note argues against the adoption of a crime fraud excep-
tion to the federal psychotherapist-patient privilege. Part I argues
that the restrictive legal elements of the privilege adequately ex-
clude fraudulent or criminal statements from protection. Part II
addresses the needed distinction between the dangerous patient
exception and the crime fraud exception to the psychotherapist-
patient privilege and concludes that the adoption of a crime fraud
exception would threaten a limited dangerous patient exception.
Part III contends that the policies underlying the attorney-client
and psychotherapist-patient privileges must be distinguished and
do not merit a shared crime fraud exception. This Note concludes
that careful examination and application of the elements of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege will adequately protect "all ra-
tional means for ascertaining truth"2 in the courtroom, in
18. Id. at 313 (emphasizing "that not every statement a patient makes in therapy can
be revealed simply because a warning was given").
19. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Violette), 183 E3d 71, 74 (1st Cir. 1999) (hold-
ing that a crime fraud exception to the federal psychotherapist-patient privilege applies
when patient's communications were made as part of a scheme to defraud lenders and
disability insurers). The attorney-client privilege generally applies:
1) where legal advice of any kind is sought, (2) from a professional legal advisor in
his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence 5) by the client, (6) are at his insistence permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except [if] the protection be waived.
United States v. Bein, 728 F.2d 107, 112 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting United States . Kovel, 296
F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961)).
20. See In re GrandJury Proceedings (Violette), 183 E3d at 75.
21. See id. at 79.
22. See id. at 77.
23. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (quoting Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
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consideration of the need for confidentiality in a psychotherapist-
patient relationship.
I. THE THREE ELEMENTS OF THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT
PRIVILEGE EXCLUDE STATEMENTS MADE IN
FURTHERANCE OF A CRIME OR FRAUD
The psychotherapist-patient privilege attaches only if communi-
cations are made (1) confidentially, (2) between a licensed
psychotherapist and his patient, and (3) in the course of diagnosis
or treatment.24 Each element may be used to limit the application
of the psychotherapist-patient privilege and exclude criminal or
fraudulent statements from its protection, without recognition of a
crime fraud exception. Should a patient consult a psychotherapist
in furtherance of a crime, the privilege is not available for failure
to meet the prima facie elements.
25
First, a patient must intend for his statements to be held in con-
fidence by the psychotherapist at the time they are made for the
statements to be privileged.2 6 Although secure communications are
an essential part of the psychotherapist patient relationship, 7 psy-
chotherapists must inform patients of the limits on confidentiality
24. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996).
25. See Lynda Womack Kenney, Note, Role ofJaffee v. Redmond's "Course of Diagnosis or
Treatment" Condition in Preventing Abuse of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 35 GA. L. REV.
345, 362 (2000); Recent Cases, Evidence-Evidentiary Privilege-First Circuit Recognizes Crime-Fraud
Exception to Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege.-In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Gregory P. Vio-
lette), 183 E3d 71 (1st Cir. 1999), 113 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1542-43 (2000) [hereinafter
Recent Cases]; see also George C. Harris, The Dangerous Patient Exception to the Psychotherapist-
Patient Privilege: The Tarasoff Duty and theJaffee Footnote, 74 WASH. L. REV. 33, 61 (1999).
26. See Kamper v. Gray, 182 F.R.D. 597, 599 (E.D. Mo. 1998); Barrett v. Vojtas, 182
F.R.D. 177, 179 (W.D. Pa. 1998); see also Scott v. Edinburg, 101 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1020-21
(N.D. Ill. 2000); Caver v. City of Trenton, 192 ER.D. 154, 161-62 (D.N.J. 2000); Phelps v.
Coy, 194 FR.D. 606, 608 (S.D. Ohio 2000); Revelle v. Darbe Borough Police Officer Trigg,
No. CIV.A.95-5885, 1999 WL 80283, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 1999); Williams v. District of Co-
lumbia, No. CIV.A.96-0200-LFO, 1997 WL 224921, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 25, 1997); Greet v.
Zagrocki, No. CIV.A.96-2300, 1996 WL 724933, *1-2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 1996).
27. SeeJaffee, 518 U.S. at 14-15. Freud believed that "thefundamental ruleof analysis...
is to tell [the therapist] not only what [the patient] can say intentionally and willingly, what
will give [the patient] relief like a confession, but everything else as well that [the patient's]
self-observation yields him, everything that comes into [the patient's] head, even if it is
disagreeable... to say it, even if it seems to him unimportant or actually nonsensicaL" Sigmund
Freud, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, in 23 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSY-
CHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 144, 174 (James Strachey et al. eds., trans., 1964)
(italics in original).
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at the outset of their relationship." For example, the privilege does
not apply to consultations with a psychotherapist for purposes of
29 . 30litigation, 2 nor to employer-ordered psychological examinations.
The statements must also be held in confidence by the patient
himself to be privileged. Disclosing statements made in therapy to
others, such as employers or friends, constitutes a waiver of the
privilege. 3' A psychotherapist who knows his patient intends to
share his communications with others cannot reasonably expect
that the patient intended for those statements to remain confiden-
tial.32 In addition, a patient who is not seeking treatment does not
have a reasonable expectation of confidentiality at the time he
makes the statement; consequently, he is estopped from invoking
the privilege.33 Criminal or fraudulent statements may be inadmis-
sible if a patient does intend to keep the statements confidential.
Thus, examination of whether a patient had a reasonable expecta-
tion of confidentiality can limit the application of a
psychotherapist-patient privilege without the need for a crime
fraud exception.
Second, psychotherapists must be licensed under state law.34 Al-
though many professionals conduct psychotherapy, the federal
psychotherapist-patient privilege is limited to state licensed psy-
chiatrists, psychologists, and social workers.3' For example,
statements made to volunteer telephone operators at an Alcoholics
Anonymous office were not protected by the psychotherapist-
patient privilege because the volunteers failed to qualify as the type
of counselors entitled to the privilege.36 They were not licensed or
28. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 13 n.12; see also infra notes 52-75 and accompanying text (discus-
sion of confidentiality).
29. See United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1046 (3d Cir. 1975) (distinguishing be-
tween relationship for purposes of diagnosis and relationship for purposes of litigation).
30. See Kamper, 182 F.R.D. at 599 ("Since [the employee] was aware that his evaluations
would be reported to his employer. [the employee] had no reasonable expectation of con-
fidentiality regarding his communications with [the evaluators].").
31. Id. at 599; Barrett, 182 F.R.D. at 179-81.
32. 182 ER.D. at 179.
33. United States v. Schwensow, 151 F.3d 650, 657-58 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding defen-
dant's request to use a telephone at a counseling center for the purpose of locating a
detoxification center did not relate to diagnosis or counseling and therefore was not a con-
fidential communication).
34. SeeJaffee v, Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1996).
35. See id. "[S]ocial workers provide a significant amount of mental health treatment.
Their clients often include the poor and those of modest means who could not afford the
assistance of a psychiatrist or psychologist." Id. at 15-16 (citations omitted). But see Oleszko
v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 243 E3d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 2001) (extending psychotherapist-
patient privilege to non-licensed employer assistance program personnel who conducted
therapy sessions in the workplace).
36. Schwensow, 151 F.3d at 657.
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trained in counseling and did not act or hold themselves out as
counselors.37 The scope of communications protected by the privi-
lege may be further limited by examining the credentials of a
psychotherapist.3s
Last, fraudulent or criminal communications are unlikely to be
made within the course of diagnosis or treatment.3 The privilege is
available only when a genuine therapeutic relationship exists, since
the privilege only applies when the patient intends to improve his
mental or emotional health through therapy. ° "[C] ommunications
that are intended to further a crime or fraud will rarely, if ever, be
allied with bona fide psychotherapy and, thus, protecting such
communications will not promote mental health., 4' In those in-
stances in which a patient's purpose in consulting with a
psychotherapist is to further a crime or fraud, rather than to pur-
sue treatment, the communications should not be privileged,
because they do not occur within the course of diagnosis or treat-
ment.
42
While at least one court has stated that fraudulent and criminal
statements will rarely be aligned with treatment, these statements
are not automatically excluded from falling within the scope of the
course of diagnosis or treatment requirement. 43 Unlike seeking
legal advice, patients who desire to break the law seek
psychotherapy because they recognize such desire as a problem
they hope to correct.44 A patient may seek therapy to end his
destructive behavior, hoping to "reveal these dangerous, criminal
impulses to the therapist for the very purpose of overcoming and
not acting upon them."45 For a client, "communications regarding
37. Id.
38. See id.
39. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Violette), 183 F.3d 71, 77 (1st Cir. 1999); Recent
Cases, supra note 25, at 1542-43.
40. SeeJaffee, 518 U.S. at 11; Recent Cases, supra note 25, at 1543.
41. In re GrandJury Proceedings (Violette), 183 F3d at 77.
42. Recent Cases, supra note 25, at 1543 ("[W]hen the relationship is in fact nonthera-
peutic, any communication will fail the initial Jaffee test, having not been made 'in the
course of diagnosis or treatment.'"). But see In re Grand jury Proceedings (Violette), 183
F.3d at 78-79 (recognizing a crime fraud exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege
although client's purpose in consulting with a psychotherapist was in furtherance of health
care fraud).
43. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Violette), 183 E3d at 74 ( "For simplicity's sake, we
therefore assume (without deciding) that Violette's communications can be said to have
been made presumptively in the course of diagnosis or treatment.").
44. Recent Cases, supra note 25, at 1543.
45. Harris, supra note 25, at 61-62.
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intentions or desires to commit future crime are at the very heart
of why a patient may seek psychotherapeutic care. ''4b
Further support that fraudulent or criminal statements should
not be automatically excluded from the protection of the privilege
is found in Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 504 (psychothera-
pist-patient privilege). The proposed Rule was rejected by
Congress in favor of the broad directive of Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 501. The Senate Judiciary Committee explicitly stated that
its rejection of the proposed Rule "should not be understood as
disapproving any recognition of a psychiatrist-patient ... privi-
leg[e] contained in the [proposed] rules."47 In fact, the Supreme
Court cited proposed Rule of Evidence 504 as a justification for its
adoption of a federal psychotherapist-patient privilege s.4
The proposed Rule did not contain a crime fraud exception and
fraudulent or criminal statements would not necessarily have been
excluded from the privilege.49 The Judicial Conference Advisory
Committee, which authored the Rule in 1972, believed that the
inclusion of an exception would threaten the heightened confi-
dentiality concerns vital to the psychotherapist-patient
relationship. "It should be noted that our committee deliberately
chose not to write a 'future crime' exception into the bill. Its
members were persuaded that, as a class, patients willing to express
to psychiatrists their intention ... are making a plea for help.' 5°
They believed the number of instances of genuine fraud in the con-
text of a psychotherapist-patient relationship would be so few that it
did not merit giving the courts any loophole through which to
pierce the privilege. 51 The framers of proposed Rule of Evidence 504
rejected a crime fraud exception to the psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege because the particular nature of the psychotherapist-patient
relationship rendered such an exception unnecessary.52
The content of communications made in therapy, therefore,
cannot be a conclusive indicator in determining whether the
communications are admitted or excluded. To admit all statements
46. Id. at 61.
47. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996) (quoting S. REP, No. 93-1277, at 13
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7059) (alterations inJaffee).
48. See id. at 13-15.
49. See FED. R. EvID. 504(d)(3) (proposed Nov. 20, 1972). The privilege would have
recognized three enumerated exceptions: in proceedings for hospitalization, in examina-
tions pursuant to court order, and in litigation if the patient's mental condition is an
element of the patient's claim or defense. Id.
50. Harris, supra note 25, at 37 n.43 (quoting Abraham S. Goldstein & Jay Katz, Psy-
chiatrist-Patient Privilege: the GAP Proposal and the Connecticut Statute, 36 CONN. B.J. 175, 188
(1962)).
51. See id.
52. See Recent Cases, supra note 25, at 1544.
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regarding a crime or fraud, without consideration of the patient's
purpose and circumstances, would not adequately protect patient
confidentiality. 3 Where it is clear, however, that the statements in
question were not made in the course of diagnosis or treatment,
the privilege cannot attach for failure to meet the legal elements.
In this way, the privilege is available only when a genuine thera-
peutic relationship exists between psychotherapist and patient.
The three legal elements of the psychotherapist-patient privilege
may be used to exclude fraudulent or criminal statements from its
protection. Unless a communication is made (1) confidentially,
(2) between a licensed psychotherapist and her patient, and (3) in
the course of diagnosis or treatment, the privilege is not available
for failure to meet the prima facie elements. 5 4 Examination of each
element should limit application of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege, rendering unnecessary the recognition of a crime fraud
exception.
II. A CRIME FRAUD EXCEPTION TO THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT
PRIVILEGE SERIOUSLY UNDERMINES PATIENT CONFIDENTIALITY
AND THREATENS A THERAPIST'S ETHICAL DUTY TO WARN
Generally, psychotherapists are bound by an ethical and legal
duty of confidentiality to their clients in all circumstances." Confi-
dentiality plays an important role in the psychotherapist-patient
relationship because therapy requires patients to fully disclose
their emotions and thoughts. The duty of confidentiality owed to
a patient by a psychotherapist is markedly different from that
which attorneys owe to their clients.
Under Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, at-
torneys have discretion as to whether they should breach the
confidentiality of their clients in cases where the client poses a risk
53. See id. at 1543.
54. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996).
55. See, e.g., Am. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS WITH AN-
NOTATIONS ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO PSYCHIATRY § 4 (2001) ("A physician shall respect
the rights of patients ... and shall safeguard patient confidences within the constraints of
the law."); see alsoJaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 13 n.12 (listing ethical codes of psycho-
therapists); Am. Psychological Ass'n, Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct, 47
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1598, 1606 at § 5.05(a) (1992) ("Psychologists disclose confidential
information without the consent of the individual only as mandated by law, or where per-
mitted by law for a valid purpose .... ") [hereinafter APA Ethics Code].
56. SeeJaffee, 518 U.S. at 10; Recent Cases, supra note 25, at 1543.
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of danger to others.5 For example, an attorney is not required to
warn or protect possible victims. "A lawyer may reveal such infor-
mation to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial
bodily harm .... 5' The ethical obligation imposed by Rule 1.6 is
extremely narrow, and applies only when the attorney "reasonably
believes" a third party to be at risk of "imminent death or substan-
tially bodily harm."59 If a lawyer fails to warm or protect a third
party from harm, a lawyer is not subject to discipline, nor liable for
damages to his client or the third party, because Rule 1.6 does not
create a mandatory duty to breach the confidence of a client in
dangerous client cases.0
Unlike attorneys, however, a psychotherapist must breach the
duty of confidentiality when the client threatens himself or others,
since protecting the safety of third parties, or the client himself,
outweighs a completely confidential psychotherapist-patient rela-• • 61
tionship. Should a patient pose a serious danger of violence to
others, the psychotherapist must breach the confidence of the cli-S • 62
ent and take action to warn, or even protect, the intended victim.
Failure to do so may breach state law and have serious conse-
quences for the psychotherapist, including malpractice actions and
personal liability to any victims.
63
57. See Irma S. Russell, Cries and Whispers: Environmental Hazards, Model Rule 1.6 and the
Attorney's Conflicting Duties to Clients and Others, 72 WASH. L. REV. 409, 423 (1997) (noting
that "disclosure is permissive"); see also Fred C. Zacharias, Limits on Client Autonomy in Legal
Ethics Regulation, 81 B.U.L. REV. 199, 205 (2001).
58. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (1) (1999) (emphasis added).
59. Id., Russell, supra note 57, at 423-24.
60. See id., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 66 (1998) ("A
lawyer who takes action or decides not to take action permitted under this Section is not,
solely by reason of such action or inaction, subject to professional discipline, liable for dam-
ages to the lawyer's client or any third person, or barred from recovery against a client or
third person."). Other ethical rules may force attorneys to breach the confidences of their
clients. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(b) (1999) (requiring attorneys to
disclose confidential information otherwise protected so as to prevent fraud upon the
court).
61. United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578, 583 (6th Cir. 2000); APA Ethics Code, supra
note 55, at § 5.05(a) ("Psychologists disclose confidential information ... to protect the
patient or client or others from harm ... ."). But see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.6 (1999) (granting complete confidentiality in attorney-client relationship with no duty to
warn victim of imminent danger).
62. Hayes, 227 E3d at 583; Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 345
(Cal. 1976); Harris, supra note 25, at 42.
63. Allison L. Almason, Comment, Personal Liability Implications of the Duty to Warn are
Hard Pills to Swallow: From Tarasoff to Hutchinson v. Patel and Beyond, 13 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 471,495-96 (1997).
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Despite wide recognition of the dangerous patient exception to
the psychotherapist's duty of confidentiality,64 few courts or legisla-
tures have clarified how to reconcile it with the evidentiary
privilege, 5 and federal recognition of a crime fraud exception may
cloud the distinction. Although the duty of confidentiality applies
in all circumstances, federal privileges apply only to the introduc-
tion of communications into evidence during a court proceeding. 6
If breach of the duty of confidentiality were to constitute a waiver
of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, it would force psycho-
therapists to comply with their ethical duty to warn potential
victims at the cost of breaching client confidence and testifying
against their clients in federal court. "It is one thing to inform a
patient of the 'duty to protect'; it is quite another to advise a pa-
tient that his 'trusted' confidant may one day assist in procuring
his conviction and incarceration."
6 8
Despite this potential dilemma, however, the Supreme Court has
suggested that a dangerous patient exception applies to the psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege. The text of footnote 19 in Jaffee v.
Redmond reads, "we do not doubt that there are situations in which
the privilege must give way, for example, if a serious threat of harm
to the patient or to others can be averted only by means of disclo-
sure by the therapist." 9 The only two circuit courts of appeal that
64. Most states recognize a dangerous patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient
privilege, often referred to as a duty to protect third parties from serious threats. Hayes, 227
F.3d at 583; Harris, supra note 25, at 47.
65. California is the only state in which breach of the professional duty of confidenti-
ality between patient and psychotherapist constitutes a waiver of the evidentiary privilege.
Hayes, 227 E3d at 585; see also Harris, supra note 25, at 48. The Oregon Supreme Court, by
contrast, has held that Tarasoff disclosures do not vitiate Oregon's psychotherapist-patient
privilege. State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 225, 236-37 (Or. 1985). See generally Recent Cases, Evidence-
Sixth Circuit Holds That Tarasoff Disclosures Do Not Vitiate Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege.-
United States %: Hayes, 227 F3d 578 (6th Cir 2000), 114 HARV. L. REV. 2194 (2001) (discuss-
ing the split in the federal courts of appeal regarding the interaction of the psychotherapist-
patient privilege and the Tarasoff duty).
66. See, e.g., Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan's Rests., Inc., 590 F.2d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 1979)
(noting that an attorney's ethical duty of confidentiality is broader than the evidentiary
privilege and involves all "information" gained in representation, as opposed to "confi-
dence" or "secret"); see also Harris, supra note 25, at 52.
67. See, e.g., Toni Pryor Wise, Note, Where the Public Peril Begins: A Survey of Psychothera-
pists to Determine the Effects of Tarasoff, 31 STAN. L. REV. 165, 177 (1978). In a study of 1272
psychotherapists one year after the second ruling in Tarasoff one-fourth "reported observ-
ing in their patients some reluctance to discuss their violent tendencies when the patients
learned that the therapist might in some circumstances breach confidentiality." Id. One-
fourth of the psychotherapists had lost patients because of the fear that the psychotherapist
would breach confidentiality. Id. at 177 n.67.
68. Hayes, 227 F.3d at 586.
69. 518 U.S. at 18 n.19.
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have ruled on this issue are split in their interpretations of the
scope of footnote 19. The Tenth Circuit has held that when a psy-
chotherapist warns a potential victim of danger posed by a patient,
the evidentiary privilege is waived] 0 Hence, the psychotherapist
may be forced to testify against his patient in court.
The Sixth Circuit, however, refused to pierce the evidentiary
privilege in dangerous patient cases.7' It noted that the ethical duty
to warn exists independently of the evidentiary privilege.
We see only a marginal connection, if any at all, between a
psychotherapist's action in notifying a third party (for his own
safety) of a patient's threat to kill or injure him and a court's
refusal to permit the therapist to testify about such threat (in
the interest of protecting the psychotherapist/patient rela-
tionship) in a later prosecution of the patient for making it.
73
The court read the language of footnote 19 as "an aside ... to
the effect that the federal psychotherapist/patient privilege will
not operate to impede a psychotherapist's compliance with the
professional duty to protect identifiable third parties from serious
threats of harm. 7"
Under this analysis, psychotherapists are able to comply with
their ethical duty of confidentiality without waiving the evidentiary
privilege of their clients. 75 The psychotherapist may alert the po-
tential victim to the danger posed by his patient, but avoid giving
testimony in court regarding the threatening or alarming state-
ments by invoking the privilege.
Recognition of a crime fraud exception to the psychotherapist-
patient privilege could render the dangerous patient exception
irrelevant. Courts currently interpret the dangerous patient excep-
tion in a narrow manner. The Sixth Circuit refused to recognize a
dangerous patient exception to the evidentiary privilege, and the
763Tenth Circuit limited its holding to the facts of the case. Should a
crime fraud exception be adopted, however, many more state-
ments concerning a potential victim would be admissible. The
70. See United States v. Glass, 133 E3d 1356, 1357 (10th Cir. 1998).
71. See Hayes, 227 E3d at 583. The Sixth Circuit did recognize that a psychotherapist
may be forced to testify in narrowly limited circumstances, such as in involuntary commit-
ment proceedings. See id.
72. See id.
73. Id. at 583-84.
74. Id. at 585.
75. Id.




legal standard for admissibility would no longer be whether the
psychotherapist warned a third party of harm, but merely whether
the statement could be interpreted as "made in furtherance of a
crime or fraud."77 Such analysis would give courts a broad sword
with which to pierce the evidentiary privilege where current fed-
eral case law regarding a dangerous patient exception would not.
This broad sword could even more seriously undermine the psy-
chotherapist-patient relationship.
[R]ecognition of a 'dangerous patient' exception surely
would have a deleterious effect on the 'atmosphere of confi-
dence and trust' in the psychotherapist/patient relationship.
While early advice to the patient that, in the event of the dis-
closure of a serious threat of harm to an identifiable victim,
the therapist will have a duty to protect the intended victim,
may have a marginal effect on a patient's candor in therapy
sessions, an additional warning that the patient's statements
may be used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecu-
tion would certainly chill and very likely terminate open
781dialogue.
Absent assurances of confidentiality, psychotherapist-patient
communication would be chilled, and public mental health would
suffer.
7'9
When a psychotherapist warns a potential victim of harm, al-
though he breaches his ethical duty of confidentiality, he acts in
furtherance of a greater good by protecting the public from in-
jury. ° In contrast, after a crime or fraud has already been
executed, a psychotherapist's testimony against her patient is prin-
cipally used to punish that patient as it is no longer needed to
protect potential victims from the patient. "State law require-
ments that psychotherapists take action to prevent serious and
credible threats from being carried out serve a far more immediate
function than the proposed 'dangerous patient' [evidentiary] ex-
ception. '0s2 The social utility of a therapist's testimony in a court
77. See Hayes, 227 E3d at 584 (criticizing the Tenth Circuit's standard by stating that
"conditioning the applicability of the proposed 'dangerous patient' exception on the stan-
dard of care exercised by a treating psychotherapist is unsound in theory and in practice");
see also Harris, supra note 25, at 52.
78. Hayes, 227 F.3d at 584-85 (citations omitted).
79. SeeJaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996).
80. Hayes, 227 F.3d at 583.
81. Harris, supra note 25, at 52.
82. Hayes, 227 F.3d at 584.
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proceeding against his patient is minimal once the psychotherapist
has prevented specific harm by warning an intended victim. 3
In addition, the Supreme Court noted that "the likely eviden-
tiary benefit that would result from the denial of the privilege is
modest. 8 4 Absent the protection of the privilege, the court main-
tained, patients would not only suffer their secrets in silence, but
also be less likely to seek out help. 5 "Without a privilege, much of
the desirable evidence to which litigants ... seek access-for ex-
ample, admissions against interest by a party-is unlikely to come
into being. This unspoken 'evidence' will therefore serve no
greater truth-seeking function than if it had been spoken and
privileged.86
Given the nature of statements made in therapy, application of
the privilege does not deprive the fact finder of probative evidence
in a judicial proceeding.87 Statements made in therapy are often
inaccurate or misleading, and express deeply buried fears and in-
adequacies."" As a result, they may not be accurate or reliable in
the fact-finding sense. 9 Unlike legal representation, the goal of
psychotherapy is not to ascertain objective truth about events in
the client's life, but to promote individual and public mental
health. 90
Federal recognition of a crime fraud exception to the
psychotherapist-patient privilege may cloud the distinction
between the dangerous patient exception to the duty of
confidentiality and the evidentiary privilege. 9' To blur these two
independent concepts jeopardizes a therapist's compliance with
his ethical duties and the confidential relationship between patient
and client which justifies the privilege. 92  "'[R]eason and
experience' teach us that a 'dangerous patient' exception which
83. See id.; Harris, supra note 25, at 52.
84. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11; see Catharina J.H. Dubbelday, Comment, The Psychotherapist-
Client Testimonial Privilege: Defining the Professional Involved, 34 EMORY L.J. 777, 802 (1985)
("Certainly, a court has no interest in allowing an individual's case to be prejudiced by nar-
rations of his fantasies.").
85. SeeJaffee, 518 U.S. at 11-12.
86. Id. at 12.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 10.
89. See Brief of Amici Curiae George R. Caesar, M.D., Joseph E. Lifschutz, M.D. and
San Francisco Psychoanalytic Institute and Society in Support of Respondents at 2, Jaffee v.
Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (No. 95-266) [hereinafter Brief for SFPIS].
90. SeeJaffee, 518 U.S. at 10; In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Violette), 183 E3d 71, 76
(lst Cir. 1999); Harris, supra note 25, at 61-62; see also Brief for SFPIS, supra note 89, at 1.
91. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing whether a breach of confi-
dentiality constitutes a waiver of the evidentiary privilege).
92. United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578, 586 (6th Cir. 2000).
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would allow a psychotherapist to testify against a patient in
criminal proceedings should not become part of the federal
common law."9' This important distinction must be made to
preserve the underlying policy goal of the privilege, which is to
promote public mental health through individual therapy.
9 4
III. DIVERGENT RATIONALES FOR THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT AND
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE AND INCONSISTENT
APPLICATION OF THE CRIME FRAUD EXCEPTION Do NOT
MERIT AN ANALOGOUS EXCEPTION TO THE
PSYCHOTHERAPIST- PATIENT PRIVILEGE
The Supreme Court has long recognized an exception to the at-
torney-client privilege where the client uses the attorney to further
a crime or fraud.9" The attorney-client privilege recognizes the ne-
cessity of counsel to fair representation in an adversarial
proceeding, and encourages clients to fully disclose past wrongdo-
ing with the confidence that their communications will not be
used against them in court.96 By allowing clients to obtain "the aid
of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its prac-
tice,"97 the privilege "promote[s] broader public interests in the
observance of law and administration of justice."98 When the client
93. Id.
94. SeeJaffee, 518 U.S. at 11.
95. See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) (discussing the exception to the at-
torney-client privilege that arises when that relationship is abused by the client's request for
advice that would further a fraud or crime); see also United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554,
562-63 (1989) (discussing the type of evidence that may be used to show the crime fraud
exception applies). The crime fraud exception attaches when "[ (1)] the client was engaged
in criminal or fraudulent conduct when he sought the advice of counsel, [or] that he was
planning such conduct when he sought the advice of counsel, or that he committed a crime
or fraud subsequent to receiving the benefit of counsel's advice ... [(2)] that the attorney's
assistance was obtained in furtherance of the criminal or fraudulent activity or was closely
related to it." In re Grand Jury Investigation (Schroeder), 842 E2d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir.
1987) (citations omitted). The quantum of evidence needed to make this showing is
"'something to give colour to the charge;' there must be 'prima facie evidence that [the
fraud] has some foundation in fact.'" Clark, 289 U.S. at 15 (citations omitted); see also Kend-
all C. Dunson, The Crime Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 20J. LEGAL PROF. 231,
232-33 (1996).
96. See Zolin, 491 U.S. at 562 (noting that absent protection from disclosure, the public
would be discouraged from seeking legal advice and would not receive competent repre-
sentation, which is essential to the adversarial system); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,
403 (1976).
97. Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888).
98. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
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seeks the services of an attorney to enable or aid the client to
commit what the client knew or reasonably should have known to
be a crime or fraud, the crime fraud exception is triggered.9 Since
the client's intentions are contrary to the purpose of the attorney-
client privilege, the privilege is forfeited and the attorney is able to
testify against his client in court.
A crime fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege is neces-
sary since attorneys can be valuable participants in the execution
of a fraud. The legal knowledge and advice given by an attorney
may assist clients in illegal conduct.'00 Removing these communica-
tions from privilege protection, therefore, should promote
compliance with the law."0"
In one case, for example, a client disclosed to his attorney that
he had stolen more than $1 million in an insurance scam. 1 2 The
client then sought legal advice from his attorney to assist in con-
cealing the money, stating, "'I thought maybe you could come up
with some idea.' ,103 The court applied the crime fraud exception
to the attorney-client privilege, and admitted the conversation in
defendant's wire fraud trial because it found the defendant sought
the attorney's services to assist him in what he knew or reasonably
should have known to be fraud.
°0 4
Attorneys have also been ordered to testify pursuant to the
crime fraud exception when a corporate counsel knew of possible
tax evasion by an employee, °5 or when an attorney was aware that
his client was systematically destroying evidentiary documents be-
fore trial. 06 The crime fraud exception to the attorney-client
privilege polices clients with illegitimate motives and protects the
attorney-client relationship from abuse. 107
Unlike the attorney-client relationship, however, the link be-
tween psychotherapy and compliance with the law is unclear.'08 "By
contrast, the public interest that the psychotherapist-patient privi-
99. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Violette), 183 .3d 71, 75 (1st Cir. 1999); Dunson,
supra note 95, at 234.
100. See Zolin, 491 U.S. at 562-63.
101. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Violette), 183 F3d at 76; Dunson, supra note 95,
at 232.
102. United States v. Reeder, 170 E3d 93, 106 (1st Cir. 1999).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 106-07.
105. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Corporation), 87 F.3d 377, 379 (9th Cir. 1996)
(compelling corporate counsel to testify regarding an employee under investigation for tax
evasion and illegal immigration even though the counsel was unaware of the specific
crime).
106. See In re Sealed Case (Synanon), 754 F.2d 395, 398,403 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
107. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563 (1989).
108. See Recent Cases, supra note 25, at 1542-43.
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lege protects is in mental health. No easy correlation exists be-
tween help for mental and emotional problems and compliance
with the law."' 09 The rationale for the psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege is not to protect an adversarial judicial process, but rather to
promote the public mental health through individual therapy." It
is difficult to imagine a situation where a therapist would further a
crime or fraud by assisting in its execution, especially if confessions
to past crimes are privileged. Only in rare cases will the patient use
therapy in furtherance of a crime or fraud."'
In addition to the disparate rationales underlying the two privi-
leges, the legal elements of the crime fraud exception under the
attorney-client privilege have been inconsistently applied in prac-
tice. If adopted as an exception to the psychotherapist-patient
privilege, the crime fraud exception would remove assurances of
psychotherapist-patient confidentiality, threatening the trust be-
tween client and therapist which "is a sine qua non for successful
psychiatric treatment."".
Once the multiple elements needed to invoke the attorney-client
privilege are satisfied, courts are generous in their application of the
crime fraud exception. First, the federal circuits are split and have
loosely interpreted what constitutes the "prima facie showing"
needed to apply the fraud exception." 3 In their decisions, the First,
Second, and Sixth Circuits have required a showing of probable
cause that the elements were met." 4 The Third, Eleventh, and D.C.
Circuits require evidence that, "if believed," would be sufficient to
support a finding that the elements of the crime fraud exception
109. Id. at 1542.
110. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996).
111. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Violette), 183 E3d 71, 79 (1st Cir. 1999); see also
supra Part II.
112. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10 (quoting Judicial Conference Advisory Committee's Notes to
Proposed Rules, 56 F.R.D. 183, 242 (1972)); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae of the American
Psychological Association in Support of Respondents at 12, Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1
(1996) (No. 95-266) (stating that confidentiality "has been deemed so essential by some that
it has been argued that psychotherapy is rendered worthless in its absence") (internal quo-
tations marks and citations omitted) [hereinafter Brief of APA].
113. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Violette), 183 F.3d at 78 (discussing the varying
interpretations of the standards applied by the Courts of Appeal in application of the crime
fraud exception).
114. See United States v. Reeder, 170 E3d 93, 106 (1st Cir. 1999); Marc Rich & Co. A.G.
v. United States (In re Richard Roe, Inc.), 68 F.3d, 38, 40 (2d Cir. 1995); Advance Publica-
tion, Inc. v. United States (In reAntitrust Grand Jury), 805 F.2d 155, 165-66 (6th Cir. 1986).
Probable cause is defined as reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been commit-
ted by a person and is proven by actual knowledge or information from a reliable source.
See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983).
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were satisfied." 5 The Fifth and Ninth Circuits apply other vari-
ants. n6 The Supreme Court has not yet reconciled the conflicting
standards.
Second, courts have inconsistently ruled on what qualifies as "in
furtherance" of a crime or fraud.' 7 For some courts, the fraud in
question need not be illegal,"" the fraud need not succeed, and
the communications need not assist the client in committing
unlawful acts for the privilege to be suspended." 9
Given the confusion under the attorney-client privilege, if the
crime fraud exception were extended to the psychotherapist-
patient privilege, the unpredictable legal standards would seriously
threaten the psychotherapist-patient relationship, and therefore
public mental health, by removing assurances of patient confiden-
tiality. As noted by the Supreme Court, the psychotherapist-patient
privilege is not subject to a case-by-base balancing test. "Making the
promise of confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge's later
evaluation of the relative importance of the patient's interest in
privacy and the evidentiary need for disclosure would eviscerate
the effectiveness of the privilege."2 If adopted, a uniform standard
would be essential.'
2 '
[I]f the purpose of the privilege is to be served, the participants
in the confidential conversation "must be able to predict with
115. See Haines v. Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 95-96 (3d Cir. 1992); In re Grand
Jury Investigation (Schroeder), 842 F.2d 1223, 1226 (lth Cir. 1987); In re Sealed Case
(Synanon), 754 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Under this standard, the prosecutor does not
have to prove the likelihood of the fraud, but only has to show evidence that "if believed"
would meet the two elements of the exception. See Haines, 975 F.2d at 96.
116. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Corporation), 87 F.3d 377, 381 (9th Cir. 1996)
("'reasonable cause to believe' "); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Fine), 641 F.2d 199, 203
(5th Cir. 1981) (relying upon "the definition of prima facie contained in Black's Law Dic-
tionary (4th ed. 1968): '[s]uch as will suffice until contradicted and overcome by other
evidence .... [a] case which has proceeded upon sufficient proof to that stage where it will
support finding if evidence to contrary is disregarded.'").
117. See Reeder, 170 F.3d at 106 (soliciting attorney for advice on tax evasion met "in fur-
therance" standard). But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Fine), 641 E2d at 203-04
(soliciting attorney for advice in registering suspicious purchase of yacht to a questionable
corporation did not meet the "in furtherance" standard).
118. See Marc Rich & Co. A.G. v. United States (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Te-
cum Dated Sept. 15, 1983), 731 E2d at 1039 ("If the advice was sought in furtherance of a
fraud that is not necessarily a violation of the criminal code, the communication is nonethe-
less unprivileged.").
119. See In re GrandJury Proceedings (Corporation), 87 F.3d at 381.
120. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17 (1996).
121. One critic observed that "[o]ne reason for disenchantment with the judicial ap-
proach is the confusing, divergent trends, which collectively do not provide helpful
guidance for the psychiatrist wishing to practice ethically and legally." Almason, supra note
63, at 471 n.3 (1997) (quoting Alan R. Felthous, M.D., The Ever Confusing Jurisprudence of
Psychotherapist's Duty to Protect, 17 PSYCHIATRY & L. 575,576 (1989)).
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some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be
protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be
certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts,
is little better than no privilege at all."
22
CONCLUSION
In sum, the federal courts should reject the adoption of a crime
fraud exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege and in-
stead carefully examine the elements of and justifications behind
the privilege to protect the critical individual and public interests
at stake. The restrictive elements inherent in the privilege, the
needed distinction between the dangerous patient exception and
the crime fraud exception, and the policies underlying the attor-
ney-client and psychotherapist-patient privilege, all counsel against
recognition of a crime fraud exception.
While many Americans openly seek legal advice, many shun
therapy as it still carries a social stigma. 23 If clients do not perceive
that the confidentiality of their communications will be protected,
they will be more likely to prematurely terminate their treatment,
or avoid seeking treatment at all. 24 "IT]he mere possibility of
disclosure may impede development of the confidential
relationship necessary for successful treatment. ' '125 A crime fraud
exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege threatens honest
and full disclosure necessary to successful therapy. The crime fraud
exception, as applied to psychotherapist-patient communications,
should be rejected by courts so that, in light of reason and
experience, "a psychotherapist-patient privilege will serve a 'public
122. Jaffee, 518 U.S at 18 (quoting Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)).
123. See id. at 10; see also Anne Bowen Poulin, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege Afterjaf-
fee v. Redmond: Where Do We Go From Here?, 76 WASH. U.L.Q. 1341, 1368 (1998); Bruce J.
Winick, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence View, 50 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 249, 259 (1996).
124. Brief of APA, supra note 112, at 15 (citing Jacob Jay Lindenthal & Claudewell S.
Thomas, Psychiatrists, the Public and Confidentiality, 170J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 319,
321 (1982) (33% of non-patients in survey said they would avoid seeing a psychiatrist if the
psychiatrist might divulge their information and 22% of the patient group surveyed said
they would avoid seeing a psychotherapist because of disclosure concerns)).
125. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10; United States v. Diamond (In re Doe), 964 E2d 1325, 1328
(2d Cir. 1992) ("Disclosure of communications to psychotherapists and their diagnoses
would frequently be embarrassing to the point of mortification for the patient.").
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good transcending the normally predominant principle of
utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.' ,
2 6
126. SeeJaffee, 518 U.S. at 15 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980)
(citation omitted)).
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